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Very little is currently known about the determinants of the capital structure of
non-western firms in developing or ‘‘relationship-based’’ capitalisms.2 Yet the eco-
nomic importance of these countries has increased substantially and their signifi-
cance is likely to expand even more in coming decades. Understanding the
determinants of capital structure in these environments is certainly worthwhile by
itself. Empirical evidence from these developing, relationship-based economies
may also provide additional insights into the forces that shape capital structures
in western countries.
Malaysia presents an interesting and important case study of relationship-based
capitalism. The close link between business and politics in Malaysia is well docu-
mented (e.g., Gomez and Jomo, 1997, 1998; Faccio et al., 2001; Gomez, 2002).
The Malaysian government plays the role of political patron to selected firms. It ex-
erts a significant influence over the corporate sector through listing restrictions, di-
rect equity ownership of listed firms, control of the banking sector, and through
government-sponsored ‘‘institutional’’ investors (Gomez and Jomo, 1997).3
The potential link between political patronage and capital structure is an impor-
tant and unexplored issue. Prior empirical work has provided some insights into the
determinants of capital structure, but this evidence is largely based on US firms (e.g.,
Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Myers, 2001; Hovakimian et al.,
2001; Frank and Goyal, 2003; Welch, 2004).4 However, Rajan and Zingales (1995)
point out the importance of understanding the link between institutions and capital
structure, a view that is also echoed by La Porta et al. (1998) and Johnson and
Mitton (2003).
Johnson and Mitton (2003) are the first to report that Malaysian firms with polit-
ical patronage (in the form of informal ties to politicians) carry more debt. However,
the focus of their paper is on the effects of capital controls and not on political
patronage and debt capacity. Moreover, they report results for only one dimension
of political patronage, use only one proxy and do so for only 1 year.
We develop a hypothesis of how firms with political patronage may be able to car-
ry more debt. This hypothesis is based upon an institutional assessment of policy
objectives, the nature of the bank sector, and the lack of a viable bond market.2 Some justify the close relation between politics and firms on policy grounds (Alavi, 1996) while others
(e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 2003) argue that ‘‘crony’’ or ‘‘relationship-based’’ capitalism (of which
political patronage is an integral part) is a result of relative financial under-development rather than some
cultural propensity for corruption.
3 All ‘‘institutional investors’’ in Malaysia are supported by various levels of government. In particular,
the two largest institutional investors, Amanah Saham National and Amanah Saham Bumiputera, are
under the control of the Department of Finance in Malaysia (Gomez and Jomo, 1997, p. 36).
4 To test the robustness of the US evidence, Rajan and Zingales (1995) carry out a study which looks at
the capital structure of G-7 countries. Their analysis reveals two findings. Evidence from US firms appears
to be robust for (western) G-7 firms. However, a deeper examination of the obvious institutional
differences between the G-7 countries indicates that the theoretical underpinnings of the observed
associations remain unresolved.
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proxies of political patronage and measures their influence over a 10-year period.
We find a positive and significant link between leverage and political patronage
for each of our three measures of political patronage. Our results are consistent with
the more limited evidence presented by Johnson and Mitton (2003). In addition, we
also find an indirect link between political patronage and firm leverage through firm
size and profitability. Our results are adjusted for firm-specific and year-specific
effects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a discus-
sion of the Malaysian institutional context and our resultant hypothesis. The follow-
ing section outlines the research design and data. Empirical results are then reported
and explained. Conclusions are provided in the last section.2. Malaysian context and hypothesis
2.1. Patronage
Malaysia was primarily a producer of two commodities (tin and rubber) when it
gained independence from Britain in 1957. Malaysian government policy (otherwise
known as the Industrialization Strategy) since then has focused on the diversification
and industrialization of the economy of the country.5 This strategy has shifted over
the years from Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) in the 1960s–1970s to Ex-
port Orientated Industrialization (EOI) in the 1980s–1990s. However, industrializa-
tion continues to be very prominent in Malaysian government policy. Firms that
are deemed to be compatible with the government industrialization policy are likely
to be ‘‘picked’’ by the government to receive ISI/EOI motivated patronage.
Social considerations have also played an important role in government policy.
The Malaysia government set out to address the socio-economic imbalance between
the ethnic groups in the country following riots in 1969 among the three dominant
ethnic groups: Malays (known as Bumiputeras), Chinese, and Indians. The policy
instruments used were the New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1970 to 1990 and
the National Development Policy (NDP) from 1991 to 2000. The objective of both
the NEP and NDP was to promote and encourage Bumiputera participation in the
corporate ownership of Malaysia. The social policy to support firms with Bumipu-
tera ownership resulted in another group of firms ‘‘picked’’ by the government to
receive NEP/NDP motivated patronage.
Informal ties with politicians may represent another type of political patronage in
a ‘‘relation-based’’ capitalism such as that of Malaysia. While informal ties with pol-
iticians can result from pure chance personal encounters (Johnson and Mitton,
2003), it would seem more likely that political patronage (such as those motivated
by ISI/EOI and/or NEP/NDP objectives) may often take on a personal dimension.5 See, for example, Alavi (1996) for a more detailed discussion.
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nomic, social, and personal) reinforcing one another. Heavy Industries Corporation
of Malaysia (listed as Hicom in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) is a good illus-
tration of this overlap (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Prime
Minister of Malaysia from 1981 to 2003, personally helped set up Hicom (one of
the largest industrial firms in Malaysia) when he was finance minister in 1980. The
Department of Finance in Malaysia provided significant resources to finance Hicom.
Of course, Dr. Mahathir is also President of UMNO (United Malays National
Organization), a powerful advocate of Bumiputera capitalism and a dominant mem-
ber of Barisan National, the ruling coalition in Malaysia for the last 30 years.
2.2. Hypothesis
Government readiness to support and, if necessary, bail out patronized firms is
obviously one important potential benefit of patronage. For example, the Malaysian
government injected substantial cash into the financially distressed Proton, the na-
tional car company (Restall, 2000). This implicit guarantee of financial support sub-
stantially reduces a firms bankruptcy risk. Periodic direct government purchases of
firm shares at a rate substantially higher than the market rate also is an observed
benefit of patronage. For example, the government bought 29% of Malaysian Air
System in December 2000 at a price roughly twice the market price (Johnson and
Mitton, 2003). A government purchase of this kind, in effect, produces a ‘‘free’’ injec-
tion of new capital for the patronized firm, thereby reducing bankruptcy risk.
Given the lack of a viable bond market, debt for most Malaysian firms takes the
form of bank loans. However, the Malaysian government has taken control of the
banking sector from Chinese and foreign interests (see Gomez and Jomo, 1997, Case
Study 3), thus placing itself in a strong position to exert dominance over the econ-
omy (Herman, 1982). This dominance may be used to facilitate policy objectives,
including ISI/EOI and NEP/NDP objectives.6
We hypothesize that firms with political patronage carry more debt. This view is
consistent with prior evidence, with anecdotal evidence (which strongly suggests a
government-induced and substantially lower bankruptcy risk for patronized firms)
and with observations drawn from the debt market in Malaysia.3. Data and methodology
3.1. Political patronage proxies
We use three different proxies to capture the economic, social and personal
dimensions of political patronage. The first proxy used is the percentage of direct6 For example, well-connected firms such as Renong and the Lion group have been able to repeatedly
roll over their debts (Dhume et al., 2001).
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ture the ISI/EOI (i.e., economic) dimension of political patronage because the gov-
ernment has little justification to take an equity position in a firm that is not
compatible with the ISI/EOI objectives. POLGovE is a continuous variable reflect-
ing the changing level of patronage at a point in time.
Our second proxy is the percentage of equity owned by ‘‘institutional’’ investors
(POLInst). ‘‘Institutional’’ investors in Malaysia are either controlled by the govern-
ment or by government sponsored and supported Bumiputera agencies. These ‘‘insti-
tutional’’ investors are established for the purpose of increasing Bumiputera
corporate ownership. POLInst is designed to capture the NEP/NDP (i.e., social)
dimension of political patronage. POLInst is also a continuous variable reflecting
the changing level of political patronage at a point in time.
The final proxy is the informal ties a firm may have with each of the three most
powerful politicians in Malaysia in the 1990s. POLInformal is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a firm is documented by Gomez and Jomo (1997) as tied to one of
the three politicians, 0 otherwise. Johnson and Mitton (2003) are the first to use this
specification in their study of capital controls in Malaysia. Our measure is based on
the same list provided by Johnson and Mitton (2003). POLInformal should capture
the personal dimension of political patronage.7
3.2. Sample data
Our sample is hand-gathered from 1990 to 1999 annual reports published by firms
listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). This method of data gathering
has a number of benefits. First, the data source is primary and official and thus more
accurate than secondary data sources. Second, the KLSE requires all its listed firms
to abide by the KLSE listing requirements. Paragraph 9.26 of the listing require-
ments state that all listed firms should prepare their annual audited accounts in
accordance with approved Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) and
the ninth Schedule of the 1965 Malaysian Companies Act. We thus have reasonable
confidence that the accounting data from the sample are consistent with accounting
standards. Third, the KLSE requires all its listed firms to abide by its disclosure stan-
dards, which include the requirement that data lodged with the KLSE must be cer-
tified by qualified auditors and made publicly available (The Listing Requirements of
KLSE, 2001). Thus, we are reasonably confident that the financial information in
this data set is consistent in quality. Finally, KLSE classifies listed firms into sectors
based on core business. Thus, this data set allows us to adjust for sector effects.7 Because this measure cannot change over time, a question exists as to whether these political ties
continue throughout the period. While noting this limitation, Johnson and Mitton (2003, p. 358) argue
that it is a minor problem given the stability of the government during the sample period. Also, political
ties (like other relationships in the non-western world) take a long time to develop and are unlikely to
change abruptly. Finally, this proxy is only one of three used in our study and all three proxies produce
consistent results.
Table 1
Descriptive sample statistics of 257 Malaysian firms 1990–1999
Consumer Manufacturing Mining Financial Construction Trading Hotel Plantation Property All sectors




N = 1670 10% 40% 2% 8% 3% 10% 1% 11% 15% 65%
Firms with ties
to politicians
N = 410 7% 27% 1% 9% 4% 18% 2% 12% 20% 16%
Government
ownership
Mean 10.4 14.0 10.1 13.0 7.0 11.0 3.0 12.0 10.0 11
(%) Median 10.6 11.0 10.4 12.0 5.0 10.0 3.5 10.5 11.0 10
‘‘Institutional’’
ownership
Mean 64 63 55 59 65 63 74 59 60 62
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because of the lack of availability of annual reports, resulting in a final balanced
panel sample of 257 firms for a period of 10 years.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample. The mean of government own-
ership is about 11% and the mean of ‘‘institutional’’ ownership is 62%. The signifi-
cance of government influence over the corporate sector in Malaysia can be seen not
only through the substantial direct equity ownership of listed firms (11%) but also
through the dominance of government controlled and sponsored ‘‘institutional’’
ownership of listed firms (62%). Moreover, a majority of the firms (65%) have a
greater than zero level of government ownership. Almost all the firms in our sample
(99%) have greater than zero level of ‘‘institutional’’ ownership. Finally, a substan-
tial number (16%) have informal ties with leading politicians. These statistics suggest
that (1) political patronage extends beyond firms having informal ties with politi-
cians; and (2) the level of patronage may differ significantly across firms receiving
political patronage. Table 1 also shows that government ownership is most pro-
nounced for manufacturing firms (40%). The same pattern is observed for firms with
informal ties to politicians (27%).
3.3. Panel data estimation procedures
Estimates obtained using panel data estimation procedures have a number of
advantages over the simply-pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) procedures (e.g.,
Hsiao, 1989). Simply-pooled OLS estimation procedures cannot adjust for firm-spe-
cific and time-specific (i.e., year-specific) effects, which, if correlated with other
explanatory variables, would produce an omitted variables bias and a mis-specified
model. This problem is serious as it produces flawed estimates. The fixed-effects
model (FEM) overcomes this problem by adjusting for these effects through the
firm-specific and time-specific intercepts. The firm-specific intercepts capture the
unobserved and/or unmeasurable firm-specific characteristics. The time-specific
intercepts capture the unobserved and/or unmeasurable time-varying characteristics.
Alternatively, the problem of omitting specific effects (both firm- and year-specific)
can be similarly overcome by the random-effects model (REM), which assumes that
the firm-specific and time-specific characteristics are randomly generated from a nor-
mal distribution and are uncorrelated with other regressors in the model. Various
statistical tests can be used to determine which model (OLS, FEM, or REM) pro-
duces the most adequate specifications. We estimated all three models and selected
the appropriate model based on statistical tests.
3.4. Variables
Empirical work on capital structure suggests that leverage (used as a measure for
capital structure) increases with fixed assets, non-debt shields, investment opportuni-
ties, and firm size and decreases with volatility, advertising expenditure, the proba-
bility of bankruptcy, profitability and uniqueness of product (e.g., Harris and
Raviv, 1991). Thus, we gather data on the following variables. The dependent
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rowings in Malaysia are from commercial banks, the leverage variable may be
viewed as a proxy for bank debt. Three proxies for political patronage (POLGovE,
POLInst, and POLInformal), are used as well as firm size (SIZE), Tangible asset
(TanAsset), profitability (ROA), investment opportunities (MTBK), and sector
dummies (sector effects). We limited our analysis to these factors since they have
been shown to be most consistently linked to leverage in previous studies (e.g.,
Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995), and because of the unavailability
of data for other factors.8 Our model resembles the model used in the G-7 study of
Rajan and Zingales (1995) except for the inclusion of political patronage and of the
panel data estimation procedure.
The firms debt ratio, or LEVERAGE, is calculated as the book value of total
debt divided by total assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. TanAsset is
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. ROA is the return on assets (the ratio of profit
to total assets). ROA, as a profitability measure, can be also construed as a proxy for
bankruptcy risk. MTBV is the ratio of price per share to book value equity per share
(a proxy for investment opportunities). The Sector Dummies variable is a vector of
dummy variables denoting the different sectors to which the firms in the sample
belong – consumer, manufacturing, mining, finance, construction, trading/services,
hotel and plantation (with properties being the omitted sector).4. Analysis
4.1. Univariate analysis
Table 2 shows the financial characteristics of the sample firms classified by
whether there is (or is not) government ownership and whether there are informal
ties between the firms and politicians. We could not subdivide the sample based
on whether a firm has ‘‘institutional’’ ownership because 99% of the firms have some
form of institutional ownership. Analysis of these data does suggest a relationship
between firm leverage and political patronage.
Firms with some degree of government ownership have a debt to total assets ratio
of 15.3%, as compared to a lower 13.7% for firms without government ownership.
This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. While the sizes of the two
groups of firms and their profitability (as measured by the return on assets) do
not differ, there are substantial differences between the tangible assets ratios for
the two groups as well as for the market to book ratio. Firms with government own-
ership have much higher tangible asset ratios, which may in turn explain their higher8 For example, the true effect of taxes on leverage cannot be assessed without information on personal
taxes of investors. We cannot obtain this information. While there are a number of non-debt tax shields in
the forms of allowances, non-taxable income and special deductions, a proxy is difficult to construct. These
shields are granted for activities (e.g., an approved training scheme) often at the discretion of the
Malaysian authorities and the disclosure of these activities is not mandatory.
Table 2
Comparative mean statistics of selected variables in 257 Malaysian firms 1990–1999





















POLGovE 0.1100 0.1655 0.0000 11.337*** 0.0769 0.1160 3.913***
POLInst 0.6199 0.5899 0.6791 23.903*** 0.6732 0.6103 6.002***
LEVERAGE 0.1521 0.1532 0.1374 11.267*** 0.2054 0.1359 5.902***
SIZE 13.0207 13.2939 12.4816 1.531 13.7025 12.8969 9.169***
ROA 0.0809 0.0780 0.0803 1.601 0.0783 0.0825 1.55
TanAsset 0.2234 0.2425 0.1855 6.599*** 0.1920 0.2291 3.257***
MKBV 2.9590 2.3673 4.1279 3.811*** 4.5083 2.6776 3.022***
Notes: POLGovE = percentage of equity owned by the government. POLInst = percentage of equity
owned by government-controlled or sponsored ‘‘institutional’’ investors. LEVERAGE = (Total debt)/
(Total assets). SIZE = log of asset book value. ROA = (Pre-tax profits)/(Total assets). TanAsset =
(Property & plants & machinery)/(Total assets). MKBV = (Market price of share)/(Shareholders Equity/
Number of ordinary shares outstanding).
*** Indicates statistical significance at the 99% confidence level.
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lower market to book ratios. These differences are statistically significant at the 1%
level.
Similar univariate comparisons are found for firms with ties to politicians as com-
pared to firms without such ties. These data again suggest a link between political
patronage and leverage. Indeed, the difference in leverage between firms with infor-
mal political ties and those without is dramatic – 20.5% versus 13.6%. There are also
differences for the other variables, though the relationships are quite distinct from
those found in Panel A. While profitability again is not statistically different between
the two groups, other characteristics are distinct. Firms with informal ties to politi-
cians are larger, have less tangible assets, and a much larger market to book ratio.
This suggests that the nature of political patronage differs considerably when that
patronage is informal as compared to when it is explicit through government own-
ership. Indeed, the contrast in the leverage ratio and the market to book ratio sug-
gests that informal political ties have much more powerful effects.
4.2. Regression analysis
Our empirical analysis uses a regression model of the following general form:
LEVERAGEit ¼ aþ b1POLit þ b2SIZEit þ b3TanAssetþ b6ROAit
þ b6MTBKit þ b Sector dummies.
We first obtain bivariate (Kendalls Tau-b) correlations among explanatory vari-
ables (Table 3). The low correlations found between explanatory variables suggest
that the problem of multicollinearity is not serious in the data set. High correla-
tions exist only between the political patronage proxies. The correlation between
Table 3
Kendalls Tau-b correlations among the dependent and explanatory variables
LEVERAGE POLGovE POLInst POLInformal SIZE ROA TanAsset MKBV
LEVERAGE 1
POLGovE 0.027** 1
POLInst 0.018** 0.501** 1
POLInformal 0.124* 0.378**  0.334** 1
SIZE 0.277** 0.104** 0.015 0.116* 1
ROA 0.170* 0.018 0.013 0.04 0.016 1
TanAsset 0.018* 0.013* 0.051 0.61 0.153* 0.090* 1
MKBV 0.026 0.007* 0.016 0.050 0.081* 0.031 0.013 1
Notes: POLGovE = percentage of equity owned by the government. POLInst = percentage of equity
owned by government-controlled or sponsored ‘‘institutional’’ investors. POLInformal = 1 if the firm is
connected with top politicians; 0 otherwise. LEVERAGE = (Total debt)/(Total assets). SIZE = log of
asset book value. ROA = (Pre-tax profits)/(Total assets). TanAsset = (Property & plants & machinery)/
(Total assets). MKBV = (Market price of share)/(Shareholders Equity/Number of ordinary shares
outstanding).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
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POLInst and POLInformal is a statistical significant 0.334. These high correlations
suggest political patronage proxies should be used as alternatives rather than
together.9
We initially obtain estimates from all three models: simply-pooled ordinary least
squares regression model (OLS), fixed-effects model (FEM), and random-effects
model (REM). We run three tests to determine the most appropriate model to use
(see, e.g., Hsiao, 1989). The Likelihood Ratio Test suggests FEM out-performs sim-
ply-pooled OLS. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test suggests REM out-performs
simple-pooled OLS. The Hausman Chi Square Test suggests that REM outperforms
FEM. Thus, REM estimates are reported in the paper. Results from the regression
model using three different proxies for political patronage are presented in Table 4.
These results are adjusted for firm-specific effects and time-specific effects (through a
two-way REM) as well as sector effects (through sector dummies).
Table 4 shows that the coefficients of POLGovE, POLInst, and POLInformal are
all positive and statistically significant. Firms with higher levels of direct government
equity ownership (POLGovE) have higher leverage. Firms with higher levels of
‘‘institutional’’ equity ownership have higher leverage. Firms with informal political
ties also have higher leverage. These results suggest that political patronage is linked
to a firms ability to carry more debt. This evidence strongly supports our hypothesis.9 The correlations results appear to suggest that there is no significant connection between large firms
and political patronage. There are two possible explanations for this. First, all the firms in our sample are
listed firms. Out of the 329,032 registered companies, there are less than 500 listed on the KLSE stock
exchange. Thus, all the firms in our sample, in a sense, are large firms. Second, many of the ‘‘smaller’’ listed
firms are well-run manufacturing firms, which are mainly Chinese-owned but politically well-connected
nonetheless (Gomez, 2002).
Table 4
Two-way random-effects regression analysis of 257 Malaysian firms 1990–1999
Independent variable Predicted sign LEVERAGE LEVERAGE LEVERAGE








SIZE ? 0.0467*** 0.0478*** 0.04831***
(2.814) (2.765) (3.617)
ROA  0.5472** 0.3129** 0.5734**
(1.971) (2.013) (2.140)
TanAsset + 0.0811*** 0.0851*** 0.09034***
(2.769) (2.714) (3.016)
MKBV + 0.0078 0.0080 0.0079
(0.816) (1.038) (1.183)
(Sector effects)
Consumer ? 0.1483*** 0.1371*** 0.1628***
(3.425) (2.753) (3.125)
Manufacturing ? 0.1123*** 0.1023*** 0.1239***
(2.869) (3.208) (2.753)
Mining ? 0.2444 0.2055 0.1419
(1.264) (1.043) (0.894)
Finance ? 0.2996*** 0.2948*** 0.3046***
(3.137) (2.658) (2.756)
Construction ? 0.2611*** 0.2394*** 0.2760***
(2.956) (2.975) (3.206)
Trading ? 0.1500*** 0.1364*** 0.1606***
(2.641) (3.520) (2.943)
Hotel ? 0.3024*** 0.3158*** 0.3192***
(3.052) (3.113) (0.3192)
Plantations ? 0.0712*** 0.0578*** 0.0811***
(2.731) (2.613) (3.018)
Observations 2570 2570 2570
Adjusted R-square 0.128 0.126 0.183
Notes: POLGovE = percentage of equity owned by the government. POLInst = percentage of equity
owned by government- controlled or sponsored ‘‘institutional’’ investors. POLInformal = 1 if the firm is
connected with top politicians; 0 otherwise. LEVERAGE = (Total debt)/(Total assets). SIZE = log of
asset book value ROA = (Pre-tax profits)/(Total assets). TanAsset = (Property & plants & machinery)/
(Total assets). MKBV = (Market price of share)/(Shareholders Equity/Number of ordinary shares out-
standing). Sector effects = sector dummy (consumer, manufacturing, mining, construction, trading/ser-
vices, hotel, and plantation, with properties being the omitted sector).
* Significance at 90% confidence level.
** Significance at 95% confidence level.
*** Significance at 99% confidence level.
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political patronage is measured. Larger firms in Malaysia carry more debt. The result
1302 D.R. Fraser et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (2006) 1291–1308is consistent with previous results from US and western firms. While size may also be
a proxy for negative probability of default, the positive effects of ISI/EOI as well as
NEP/NDP for larger firms may go beyond political patronage. Thus, policy effects
can further reinforce the conventional size effects.
The coefficient of TanAsset is positive and statistically significant in all three
regressions. This result is consistent with the results based on US and western firms
and with the argument that tangible assets are easier to collateralize. In a bank dom-
inated financial system, as is the case in Malaysia, firms may well have no choice but
to establish strong relationships with their banks. The collateral value of tangible as-
sets remains important in a firms ability to carry more debt even after adjusting for
the effects of political patronage.
The coefficient of ROA is negative and statistically significant in all three coeffi-
cients. This result is consistent with those from US and western firms: profitable
firms carry less debt, despite the fact that interest payment is also tax-deductible
in Malaysia. Our result regarding ROA is adjusted for the effects of political patron-
age. The coefficient of MKBV, the proxy for investment opportunities, is not signif-
icantly different from zero in all three regressions. One explanation for this result is
that political patronage may be a better proxy for investment opportunities than
MKBV in Malaysia. Finally, the coefficients for sector dummies all are statistically
different from zero with the Mining sector being the sole exception. These results
suggest the importance of adjusting for sectors effects.
4.3. Further analysis
Our regression analysis confirms a direct link between capital structure and polit-
ical patronage. However, there may also be indirect links between capital structure
and political patronage through interactions with the variables known to be associ-
ated with capital structure. To investigate the potentially interactive effects, we intro-
duce four interactive variables into the model: POLGovE*Size (POLInst*Size and
POLInforml*Size), POLGovE*TanAsset (POLInst*TanAsset and POLInfor-
mal*TanAsset), POLGovE*ROA (POLInst*ROA and POLInformal*ROA), and
(POLINst*MTBV and POLInformal*MTBV).
Our results are shown in Table 5. The coefficients of the non-interactive variables
remain materially the same as in Table 4, with the exception of the coefficient of
ROA, which ceases to be significantly different from zero. The coefficients of the
interactive variable POLGovE*Size (POLInst*Size) and of the interactive variable
POLGovE*ROA (POLInst*ROA, POLInformal*ROA) are positive and statistically
significant. The political patronage proxies (POLGovE, POLInst, and POLInfor-
mal) are linked to capital structure both directly and indirectly through their inter-
action with two of the four variables known to be associated with capital
structure: SIZE and ROA.
Larger firms with political patronage appear to carry more debt than mere firms
with political patronage. Profitable firms with political patronage carry more debt
than mere firms with political patronage. Political patronage increases a firms
leverage both directly and indirectly through its interaction with firm size and
Table 5
Two-way random-effects regression analysis of 257 Malaysian firms 1990–1999 (with interactive variables)
Independent variable Predicted sign LEVERAGE LEVERAGE LEVERAGE








SIZE ? 0.0492*** 0.0494*** 0.0483***
(2.925) (2.742) (3.268)
ROA  0.4128 0.2143 0.6073
(0.796) (0.843) (1.175)
TanAsset + 0.0795** 0.0714*** 0.0821***
(2.297) (2.650) (2.834)



























Consumer ? 0.1306* 0.1362* 0.1566**
(1.778) (1.692) (1.983)
Manufacturing ? 0.1505* 0.1153** 0.1186***
(1.750) (1.984) (2.678)
Mining ? 0.2470 0.2789 0.1108
(1.351) (1.294) (1.136)
Finance ? 0.2271*** 0.2239*** 0.3088***
(3.002) (3.123) (2.898)
Construction ? 0.2788* 0.2493** 0.2743***
(continued on next page)
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Table 5 (continued)
Independent variable Predicted sign LEVERAGE LEVERAGE LEVERAGE
(1.769) (2.013) (2.664)
Trading ? 0.1554 0.1694 0.1612**
(1.542) (1.602) (1.673)
Hotel ? 0.2827*** 0.1864*** 0.3203***
(2.789) (2.810) (2.735)
Plantations ? 0.0704** 0.0585*** 0.0852**
(2.132) (2.937) (2.410)
Observations 2570 2570 2570
Adjusted R-square 0.128 0.126 0.183
Notes: POLGovE = percentage of equity owned by the government. POLInst = percentage of equity
owned by government- controlled or sponsored ‘‘institutional’’ investors. POLInformal = 1 if the firm is
connected with top politicians; 0 otherwise. LEVERAGE = (Total debt)/(Total assets). SIZE = log of
asset book value. ROA = (Pre-tax profits)/(Total assets). TanAsset = (Property & plants & machinery)/
(Total assets). MKBV = (Market price of share)/(Shareholders Equity/Number of ordinary shares out-
standing). Sector effects = sector dummy (consumer, manufacturing, mining, construction, trading/
services, hotel, and plantation, with properties being the omitted).
* Significance at 90% confidence level.
** Significance at 95% confidence level.
*** Significance at 99% confidence level.
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interaction between political patronage and size suggests that the leverage increasing
effects of political patronage are stronger for larger firms and for more profitable
firms.
4.4. Robustness checks
We also estimated the Granger ‘‘causality’’ test in order to assess the issue of cau-
sality. Our results show that neither political patronage ‘‘causes’’ leverage nor lever-
age ‘‘causes’’ political patronage. In addition, we carried out the Hausman
specification test to assess the issue of simultaneity between leverage and political
patronage. We find no evidence of simultaneity. This is not surprising given the re-
sults of the Granger test, which is in fact a test of endogeneity.
We also re-estimated the regressions after excluding a few ‘‘outliers’’ based on the
method suggested by Neter et al. (1990). These results, both in terms of signs and
statistical significance, are not materially different from those reported. We also
re-estimated the regressions excluding financial firms with no meaningful differences
in results.
There may be some clustering since POLInformal, the dummy variable for infor-
mal ties, does not change over time. To adjust for these possible clustering effects, we
re-run the regressions (by stating POLInformal is the clustering variable) and obtain
clustering-adjusted standard errors. We find no change in the significance level of
other coefficients in both regressions. However, the significance level of the POLIn-
formal coefficient is reduced from the 95% level to the 90% level in the regression
without interactive variables. The significance level of the POLInformal coefficient
Table 6
Whole-period and sub-period coefficients
1990–1999 1990–1996 1998–1999
Panel A: Coefficients using book value leverage (book value of debt/book asset value)
Model without interactive variables
POLGovE 0.0751*** 0.0713*** 0.0728***
(3.021) (3.235) (3.163)
POLInst 0.1625** 0.1540*** 0.1669**
(2.142) (2.343) (2.025)
POLInformal 0.3727** 0.3295** 0.3452*
(2.253) (2.106) (1.926)
Model with interactive variables
POLGovE 0.0695*** 0.0713*** 0.682**
(3.251) (3.318) (2.518)
POLInst 0.1139** 0.1341** 0.1117**
(2.247) (2.435) (2.305)
POLInformal 0.4372* 0.4017* 0.4426*
(1.852) (1.738) (1.9121)
Panel B: Coefficients using market value leverage (book value of debt/market value of equity)
Model without interactive variables
PolGovE 0.1537*** 0.1403*** 0.1735**
(2.863) (2.671) (2.305)
PoLInst 0.3728** 0.3354** 0.3682*
(1.9847) (2.236) (1.856)
POLInformal 0.6247** 0.6451** 0.6392*
(2.285) (2.303) (1.910)
Model with interactive variables
POLGovE 0.1926*** 0.1803** 0.2156***
(3.137) (2.231) (3.214)
POLInst 0.4572*** 0.4418** 0.4163**
(2.591) (2.379) (2.093)
POLInformal 0.7681** 0.7357* 0.7468**
(1.980) (1.793) (2.403)
Notes: POLGovE = percentage of equity owned by the government. POLInst = percentage of equity
owned by government- controlled or sponsored ‘‘institutional’’ investors. POLInformal = 1 if the firm is
connected with top politicians; 0 otherwise.
* Significance at 90% confidence level.
** Significance at 95% confidence level.
*** Significance at 99% confidence level.
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significance level is still maintained. Thus, we conclude that clustering does not ap-
pear to be an important problem. We did the same for POLGovE and POLInst and
again observe the lack of a serious clustering problem.
As reported earlier, we lost 65 firms from the initial list of firms. Since we do not
know what happened to these firms, we cannot rule out the existence of selection bias
as a potential problem. Some of these 65 firms may have gone into bankruptcy, been
acquired, changed names, or disappeared for other reasons. As an initial check on
1306 D.R. Fraser et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (2006) 1291–1308the potential significance of this problem, we compare our hand-gathered sample
with the sample in Johnson and Mitton (2003). Their sample was collected from
Worldscope.
The average firm size (measured by the natural log of book value) is practically
the same for both samples: 13.8 in Johnson and Mittons sample and 13.02 in our
sample. Similarly, firms with ties to politicians tend to be significantly larger in both
samples. Firms in Johnson and Mittons sample appear to have more leverage, on
average, than those in our sample (23.7% versus 15.2%). This may reflect the fact
that our sample covers a 10-year period rather than just 1 year. In both samples,
firms with ties to politicians have significantly higher leverage than firms without.
Firms in our sample have a higher ROA (8%) than firms in Johhson and Mittons
yearly sample (4%). However, both our data and those of Johnson and Mitton show
no significant difference in ROA between firms with political ties and firms without.10
Finally, firms in both samples appear to have very similar MKBV: 2.96 in our sample
and 2.22 in Johnson and Mitton.
The comparison above suggests that these two samples are quite similar and pro-
vides further evidence that selection bias is not a serious problem. Furthermore, if
some of these firms did go into bankruptcy or were acquired, they would most likely
have disappeared during the Asian financial crisis. To investigate this, we subdivided
the sample into two sub-samples: 1990–1996 (before the crisis) and 1998–1999
(after the crisis). The results from the sub-samples (shown in Panel A, Table 6)
are virtually the same as those from the entire sample, further suggesting that the
missing observations do not bias our results. Finally, we use an alternative proxy
for leverage (the ratio of book value of debt to market value of equity) and re-run
the regressions for the entire sample (1990–1999) and two sub-samples (1990–1996
and 1998–1999). Panel B, Table 6 shows the major coefficients. Again, the results
(in terms of direction and statistical significance) are not materially different.
The results from Table 6 suggest that the link between capital structure and polit-
ical patronage does not appear to have been significantly affected by the financial cri-
sis in 1997. One possible explanation for this evidence is that Malaysia very much
remains a ‘‘relationship-based’’ and developing economy after the crisis. The evi-
dence of a continued link between capital structure and political patronage may also
reflect the fact that the link between business and politics remains ‘‘more of the
same’’ in Malaysia after the 1997 financial crisis (Gomez, 2002, p. 107).5. Conclusions
This paper examines the link between firm leverage and political patronage in a
group of Malaysian firms over an extended 10-year period. Our hypothesis is that
firms with political patronage in Malaysia carry more debt. Consistent with this
hypothesis, we find a positive and significant link between leverage and political
patronage for all three different measures of political patronage. Our result is also10 Johnson and Mitton (2003, p. 363).
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leverage and informal ties to politicians. We also find evidence that the link between
political patronage and firm leverage is indirect through firm size and profitability.
Larger firms with political patronage tend to carry more debt than mere firms with
political patronage. Profitable firms with political patronage tend to carry more debt
than mere firms with political patronage. Our results are adjusted for firm-specific
and year-specific effects.
Our results from Malaysia are also consistent with previous US and G-7 country
studies on firm capital structure. Firm leverage is positively correlated with size,
profitability, and asset tangibility. However, investment opportunities (as measured
by the market-to-book asset ratio) do not appear to be related to firm leverage. The
implication may be that political patronage may be a better proxy for investment
opportunities than market-to-book value in Malaysia.
Our results for Malaysia firms suggest that there is a difference in capital structure
between ‘‘market-based’’ capitalisms (e.g., US or G-7 countries) and ‘‘relationship-
based’’ capitalisms (e.g., Malaysia). Furthermore, this difference may be explained
by interrelated institutional factors which include policy objectives, the nature of
the bank sector, and the lack of a viable bond market.References
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